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Yesterday I showed that in advanced countries happiness has not risen, despite 
unprecedented increases in income.  Today I want to try to explain this, and to draw 
some policy conclusions. 
 
But first I need to start with a caution (Figure 1).  As the golfer says, 
“Researchers say I’m not happier for being richer, but do you know how much 
researchers make?” 
 
In one sense the golfer is on to something.  For there are two key facts that we 
have to explain.  First at any one time rich people are on average happier than poorer 
ones.  And yet over time advanced societies have not grown happier as they have 
grown richer.  
 
What is happening is illustrated in this table (Table 1).  In 1975 rich people (in 
the top quarter) were happier than poor ones (in the bottom quarter).  The same was 
true in 1998, when both groups were both richer than before (especially the top 
group).  But in 1998 each group was no more happy then before, despite its higher 
income.  That is the challenge, and the paradox. 
 
Table 1 
Happiness in the US: by income 
 Top quarter 
of income 
Bottom quarter 
of income 
 1975 1998 1975 1998 
Very happy  39  37 19 16 
Pretty happy  53  57 51 53 
Not too happy  8  6 30 31 
 100 100 100 100 
 
 
                                                
Source: General Social Survey tapes. People over 16. 
 
It is an absolutely standard pattern in all countries.  And indeed we find much 
the same if, instead of taking two dates for the same country, we take two countries at 
the same time – with one country being richer than another. 1  So what is going on?  
On the one hand a given individual in a given country becomes happier if he is richer, 
 
1 Parenthetically, if we take health and compare richer and poorer countries in the old OECD, we find 
the same again: within any country the richer individuals are healthier than the poorer, but across 
countries the poor country is as healthy as the rich one. At least that is true of life expectancy, which is 
about the best objective measure of health that we have.  Wilkinson (1996). 
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and that is why most people want to be richer.  But at the same time, when the whole 
society becomes richer, nobody seems to be any happier. 
 
Obviously people must be comparing their income with some norm – some 
level of expectations.  And that norm must be moving up in line with actual income.  
You can see this from the following data collected by the Gallup Poll in the US for 
many years.  They asked, ‘What is the smallest amount of money a family of four 
needs to get along in this community?’  Over time, as Figure 1 shows, the answers 
rose in line with actual incomes.2 
 
Another depressing fact confirms that this is the mechanism at work.  Since 
1972 Americans have been asked whether they are satisfied with their financial 
position.  Although real income per head has risen by 50%, the proportion of people 
who say they are pretty well satisfied with their financial situation has actually fallen.3 
 
Figure 1 
Required real income and actual average real income (1952 = 100) 
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2 See Rainwater (1990) Table 1. The question has not been asked since 1986 when Gallup moved from 
face-to-face to telephone interviewing. 
3 GSS data.  See Lane (2000) p.25. 
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This moving up of the norm is coming from two sources – first habituation 
and second rivalry.  First, I compare what I have with what I have become used to 
(through a process of habituation).  As I ratchet up my standards, this reduces the 
enjoyment I get from any given standard of living.  Second, I compare what I have 
with what other people have (through a process of rivalry).  If others get better off, I 
need more in order to feel as good as before.  So, we have two mechanisms which 
help to explain why all our efforts to become richer are so largely self-defeating in 
terms of the overall happiness of society. 
 
I want to discuss these effects in turn – and then to discuss the policy 
implications.  I’ll begin with habituation, or as psychologists call it adaptation. 
 
 
HABITUATION 
 
A key feature of any successful organism is its ability to adapt to its 
environment, and human beings are amazingly adaptable.  This is a strength and a 
weakness.  In the face of adversity it saves us from abject misery, but it also makes it 
difficult to lift us onto a permanently higher plane of experience. 
 
On the downside, people who become paraplegic suffer greatly immediately 
after their stroke.  But after a while their happiness is only slightly below the average 
in the population.4  The same is true on the upside – for example after people get 
married.5 
 
So when our living standards increase, we love it at first but then we get used 
to it and it makes little difference.  But we would find it very difficult to go back - to 
where we started from.  I had no central heating at home until I was 40, but now I can 
barely imagine living without it. 
 
                                                 
4 Brickman et al. (1978). 
5 Kahnemann. 
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The evidence for habituation comes from many sources.  One approach is to 
compare individuals with different incomes.6  Each individual is asked, ‘What after-
tax income for your family would you consider to be: very bad, bad, insufficient, 
sufficient, good, very good?’  From these answers we can pick out for each individual 
the income level which is mid-way between sufficient and insufficient.  This ‘required 
income’ varies strongly with the actual income of the individual: a 10% rise in actual 
income causes a roughly 5% rise in required income.7 
 
Alternatively we can look at reported happiness over time.  In panel studies of 
individuals in the UK job satisfaction is unaffected by the level of wages and depends 
only on their rate of change – implying a strong negative effect of habituation coming 
from the previous lagged wage.8  At a more aggregate level, in a panel of countries Di 
Tella, MacCulloch and I (2002) found that lagged income reduced average happiness 
by two thirds as much as current income increased it.  (Thus a steady rise in income 
did increase happiness somewhat, but in the historical record this effect was off-set by 
the negative effects of other changes – higher divorce, crime and so on.) 
 
So people measure their situation largely by reference to where they have 
recently got to.  They are on what psychologists call the ‘hedonic treadmill’.  They try 
to rise up a rung but in the next period that rung is once again at the bottom, from 
which they again try to rise.  We have essentially a problem of addiction, where 
people’s past standard of living affects in a negative way the happiness they get from 
their present living standard.  In this way it is just like smoking. 
 
If we just got used to everything equally, that might be the end of the story – 
with no clear policy implications.  But, as Robert Frank has argued strongly, the 
things that we get used to most easily and then take for granted are our material 
possessions – our car, our house.  We do not have the same experience with the rest of 
our life, the time we spend with our family, nor with the quality and security of our 
job.9 
                                                 
6 Van Praag and Frijters (1999) 
7 Similar results are found in 9 different countries. The ‘required income’ also varies with family size 
in a way that produces sensible equivalence scales for family income requirements.  
8 Clark (1999). 
9 Frank (1999), chapter 6. 
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If we do not foresee how we get used to our material possessions, we shall 
over-invest in acquiring them, at the expense of our leisure.  There is lots of evidence 
that people underestimate the process of habituation.10  (For example, academics think 
that gaining tenure will make them happier for longer than it actually does.)  The 
result is a distortion of our life towards work and away from other pursuits.  I want to 
stress that that is the main distortion rather than the distortion between spending and 
saving.  And a natural way to offset the distortion is to tax spending (just as we tax 
smoking) in order to discourage excessive self-defeating work.11 
 
 
RIVALRY 
 
Let me turn now to the second factor explaining the paradox of income and 
happiness: I mean the phenomenon of rivalry.  Let me begin with a simple question.  
Let me ask you which of these two worlds you would prefer, assuming prices constant 
(Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 
Which world would you prefer? 
(prices are the same) 
 
 
A. You get $50k a year and others get half that 
 
B. You get $100k a year and others get more than double that 
 
 
In a recent study, graduate students of public health at Harvard were asked just that 
question.12  The majority preferred the first type of world.  They were happy to be 
poorer, provided their relative position improved. 
 
                                                 
10 This includes those who start smoking, see Loewenstein and Schkade (1999), and Loewenstein et al 
(2000). 
11 See Layard (1980, 2002). 
12 Solnick and Hemenway (1998). 
 7
RL349b  27 February 2003 
Many other studies have come to the conclusion - that people care about other 
peoples’ incomes as well as their own.13  We are all upset when others get a raise but 
we do not.  And the only situation where we might happily accept a pay cut is when 
others do the same.  That is why there was so little economic discontent in the Second 
World War.  By contrast the great inflation of the 1970s created great discontent, 
because throughout most of the year other people’s wages were rising rapidly, while 
one’s own wage was constant.14  
 
When people compare their wages, it is generally with people close to 
themselves, rather than with film stars or paupers.  What matters is what happens to 
your “reference group” because what your reference group gets might have been 
feasible for you, while what David Beckham gets is not.  Hence much of the most 
intense rivalry is within organisations and within families.  In organisations, calm can 
often be maintained only by keeping peoples’ salaries secret.  In families, it has been 
found that the more your spouse earns, the less satisfied you are with your own job.15  
And among women, if your sister’s husband is earning more than your own husband 
earns, you are more likely to go out to work.16  In other words people are concerned 
about their relative income and not simply about its absolute level.  They want to keep 
up with the Joneses or if possible to outdo them. 
 
If people change their reference group, this can seriously change their 
happiness.  Let me give you two examples where in both cases people became 
objectively better off but felt subjectively worse.  One is the case of East Germany 
where the living standards of those in work have soared since 1990, but their level of 
happiness has plummeted because they now compare themselves with the West 
Germans, rather than with other countries in the Soviet bloc.  Another case is women, 
whose pay and opportunities have improved considerably relative to men, but their 
level of happiness has not.  Indeed in the US women’s happiness has fallen relative to 
men’s, perhaps because they compare themselves more specifically with men than 
they used to, and are therefore more aware of the gaps that still exist. 
 
                                                 
13 Clark and Oswald (1996). Runciman (1966) 
14 Ashenfelter and Layard (1983). 
15 Clark (1996). 
16 Neumark and Postlewaite (1998). 
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Given rivalry, the findings of our table are not very surprising.  The rich are 
happier than the poor, because from their lofty position the people they compare 
themselves with include a greater fraction of people who are poorer than they are.  
And the opposite is true of those at the bottom of the pile. 
 
But for a society as a whole the implications are massive.  Imagine the most 
extreme case, where people care only about their relative income and not at all about 
their income as such.  Then economic growth cannot make people better off.  The 
only exception is if people were to adopt reference groups that were lower in the 
pecking order than before.  But, if the reference group remained stable and relative 
income were unchanged, everybody’s happiness would remain the same. 
 
However the evidence suggests that things are not quite as bad as that.  If we 
compare states in the USA we find that, if other people in your state get more, you do 
feel worse off.17  But the negative feeling is not so large that it completely cancels the 
gain, provided your income rises as much as everyone else’s.  So there is hope after 
all.  To be precise, if my income increases, the loss of happiness to everybody else is 
about 30% of the gain in happiness to me. 
 
This is a form of pollution, and to discourage excessive pollution, the polluter 
should pay for the disbenefit he causes.  So the polluter should lose 30 pence out of 
every 100 pence that he earns – a tax rate of 30% on all additional income.  Assuming 
the tax proceeds are returned to him through useful public spending, he will work less 
hard – and the self-defeating element in work will have been eliminated. 
 
But for this conclusion to be correct, one further condition must be satisfied: 
though people are comparing their income with that of other people, they must not be 
comparing their leisure.  Is that in fact how we behave?  To throw light on it, we need 
to look at a second question which was asked of the Harvard students.  They were 
offered two further possible worlds, C and D (Figure 3). 
                                                 
17 Blanchflower and Oswald (2000). 
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Figure 3 
Which world would you prefer? 
 
 
C. You have 2 weeks vacation, and others have half that 
 
D. You have 4 weeks vacation, and others have double that 
 
 
Only 20% of the students chose world C.  So most people are not rivalrous about their 
leisure.  The result is that we consume too little leisure, unless this is corrected by 
public policy. 
 
In reply to this argument, libertarians often argue that the rivalrous person has 
only himself to blame, and he should not be protected by public efforts to discourage 
others from earning money.  But this is to miss the mark.  We may be able to modify 
human nature.  But we cannot annihilate our existing nature – and libertarians should 
be the first to take that as their starting point. 
 
 
RETHINKING PUBLIC ECONOMICS 
 
In fact the phenomena of rivalry and habituation are so important that they 
require a complete rethinking of the theory of public economics.  By public 
economics I mean the theory of microeconomic policy as developed in particular by 
James Meade, Amartya Sen and Tony Atkinson, all from LSE, as well as James 
Mirrlees. 
 
The normal starting point in that theory is that taxation distorts the choice 
between leisure and income – making people work too little.  The taxation may be 
justified by the value of the public expenditure or the redistribution which it finances.  
But, when comparing the tax cost with the benefits of the spending, we should always 
allow for a substantial “excess burden” of the tax, coming from the distorted choices 
it is supposed to have caused.  In this sense the presumption is always against state 
activity. 
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Rivalry and habituation lead to a quite different conclusion.  They tell us that 
in an efficient economy, there will be substantial levels of corrective taxation.  And so 
long as taxation is not higher than that, cost-benefit analysis of public expenditure 
need not worry about any excess burden coming from the costs of financing the 
expenditure. 
 
So what is the appropriate level of taxation at the margin?  The quantitative 
evidence is only beginning to accumulate, but I have already suggested 30 per cent to 
deal with rivalry, and the evidence suggests at least as much to deal with habituation.  
Thus 60 per cent would not seem inappropriate, and that is in fact the typical level of 
marginal taxation in Europe – if you allow for direct and indirect taxes.18  I suspect 
that in some almost unconscious way the electorate understand that the scramble to 
spend more is in some degree self-defeating and this makes them more favourable to 
public expenditure.  But the time is now ripe to make this argument explicit – as one 
of the central features of Social Democracy, or dare I say it the Third Way. 
 
We should be clear that such taxation is almost certainly reducing our 
measured GDP, by reducing work effort.  But we should be equally clear that this 
does not matter, because GDP is a faulty measure of well-being. 
 
 
CHANGING VALUES 
 
So far we have taken people’s values as given, and thought about how people 
can have the best life, given these values.  That is a reasonable first step and it is one 
that economists are good at. 
 
But values are not of course given, and society has a major impact on them.  
So I want to end this lecture by discussing first how far our rivalrous attitudes can and 
should be modified, and second whether existing tendencies are tending to exacerbate 
them. 
 
                                                 
18 See also Layard (2002). This argument assumes that few people compare their incomes with those in 
other countries. 
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Clearly a degree of rivalry is wired into our genes.  Among our monkey 
relatives the top male monkey gets the females.  In consequence monkeys with the 
strongest drive to reach the top reproduce most and that drive has become spread 
throughout the species. 
 
The mechanism that produces that drive is interesting.  It is not so much the 
desire to reproduce as the sheer pleasure of being top.  Serotonin is a neurotransmitter 
that accompanies good feeling, and McGuire and his colleagues at UCLA studied 
how the level of serotonin varies in vervet monkeys.19  When a male monkey 
becomes top monkey his serotonin level soars.  But, if the researchers artificially 
displace him from that position, his serotonin level drops.  Similar effects are evident 
in humans, so that people who win Oscars live 4 years longer than people who are 
nominated but fail to win.20  So the desire for position and status seems to be a 
universal among our ancestors and among ourselves. 
 
Clearly this competitive instinct enhanced reproductive fitness in the wild.  
But, since our life has become easier, we have reconsidered our situation.  We now 
preserve weaker members of the species who would have perished in rougher times.  
What should we do about our competitive instinct? 
 
To question the competitive instinct is not to be a Communist.  We all know 
that life goes better when most people make most of their own arrangements for 
satisfying their needs.  The market system delivers better products and more personal 
autonomy. 
 
But there remains the problem that actions undertaken in pursuit of status are 
truly fruitless at the level of society.  In case this is still not obvious, I want to spell it 
out once more.  For I can hear people saying, I don’t mind if my carmaker is only 
motivated by status, provided he gives me a good car. 
 
 
                                                 
19 McGuire et al (1993). 
20 Redelmeier and Singh (2001). 
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THE FALLACY OF CONSUMER SOVEREIGNTY 
 
The fallacy here is to think of consumers and producers as different.  We are 
each of us at one and the same time a consumer and a producer.  We both consume 
the output and produce it.  Of course I value much of what I consume, for its own 
sake.  But, if I also seek further income and consumption as a route to status, that part 
of my effort is self-defeating.   
 
To see this let’s look at the happiness function of the ith person. 
iiii Rank )nConsumptio Valued,Leisure(fHappiness α+=  (1) 
I sacrifice Leisure both to increase Consumption that I value for its own sake, and to 
get Rank.  But, if I now look at society as a whole, 
 Constant )nConsumptio Valued,Leisure(fHappiness ii
i
i
i
+∑=∑  
So, even if we do value much of our consumption for its own sake, the extra work that 
is done to achieve rank is totally counterproductive.  It achieves nothing because the 
total of rank is fixed.  The game is zero-sum.  When we bring people up, we should 
therefore try to reduce their  and avoid creating institutions that focus attention on 
rank. 
s α
 
That is the negative agenda: it says we should avoid those games against other 
people, which are intrinsically zero sum.  But there’s also a positive agenda: to 
promote enjoyment of games against nature, where we develop our talents to the 
highest possible level because such achievement gives us satisfaction. 
 
We should support benchmarking designed to show us what we could achieve.  
But we should question benchmarking where league table scores are highly public and 
deliberately made public in order to motivate people through the quest for rank.  For 
this condemns as many to fail as to succeed – not a good formula for raising human 
happiness.  The utility function we should be promoting through our system of 
childrearing is 
iiiii Output  Rank   )nConsumptio Valued ,(Leisure fHappiness β+α+=   
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where α  is as small as possible and β  as large as possible.  Above all we want people 
to enjoy their contribution to the social product – a notion unknown to standard 
economics but experienced by each one of us.  The virtue of the last term in the 
equation is that when summed across all people it can grow without limit – it is non-
zero-sum. 
 
 
THE RECORD OF THE 1980s AND 1990s 
 
Against this background, how has society evolved in the 1990s?  I would say: 
 up and β  down.  There has been increasing stress on “getting ahead”, and on 
financial incentives as the way to motivate people.  The whole aim in modern pay 
policy is to align pay and output as closely as possible – in other words performance-
related pay.  This is easy to do when output is simple to measure, as it is for many 
mechanical tasks and for some individualistic ones in the financial sector.  It is more 
difficult to align pay with output the more the task is multi-dimensional, long-term 
and based on teamwork.  In these cases people have to be evaluated by a relative 
rather than an absolute standard – how they compare with their peers.  By focussing 
on comparative performance, this inevitably raises 
α
α . 
 
And there is also another effect.  Economists and politicians have tended to 
assume that when external motives for performance are increased, other motives 
remain the same.  But that is not so, as our colleague Richard Titmuss pointed out 
long ago when discussing the supply of blood.21  Let me report two suggestive 
studies.  Edward Deci gave puzzles to two groups of students.22  One group he paid 
for each correct solution, the other he did not.  After time was up, both groups were 
allowed to go on working.  The unpaid group did much more further work – due to 
their intrinsic interest in the exercise.  But, for the group that had been paid, the 
external motivation had reduced the internal motivation that would have otherwise 
existed. 
 
                                                 
21 Titmuss (1970). 
22 Deci and Ryan (1985). 
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A second example is a real life case from Switzerland in 1993 when two 
communities had been selected as potential sites for the storing of radioactive waste.  
An economist Bruno Frey arranged a survey of most of the inhabitants.23  They were 
asked two questions.  First, “Would you be willing to have the repository here?”  51% 
said Yes.  Following that they were asked, “If you were offered a certain amount of 
compensation (specified), would you be willing to have the repository here?” To this 
second question under 25% said Yes.  Thus focussing on financial rewards reduced 
people’s willingness to act on the merits of the case. 
 
In the light of this it seems that British governments over the last 20 years 
have made serious errors in their approach to the reform of public services.  They 
have stressed ever more the need to reward individual performance, rather than 
providing an adequate general level of pay and stressing the importance of the job and 
the promotion of professional norms and professional competence. 
 
I want to end this section with one other issue.  As you will remember, we are 
trying to explain why happiness has not risen, and why depression, alcoholism and 
crime have – especially in the golden period of economic growth 1950-73.  It is no 
good blaming economic growth in general since in some earlier periods of economic 
growth like 1850-1914 alcoholism and crime both fell.  So what was new in the post-
war world?  The most obvious transformation of our life was the arrival of television, 
which shows us with total intimacy how other people live.  Where people once 
compared themselves with the people round the corner, they can now compare 
themselves with anyone they like, up to J.R. in Dallas.  It would be astonishing if such 
comparisons were not unsettling. 
 
Television differs from any previous medium of communication in two ways.  
The first is immediacy.  But the second is the sheer amount of exposure.  The typical 
(median) Briton watches television for 3½ hours a day – roughly 25 hours a week.24  
Over a lifetime a typical Briton spends more time watching television than doing paid 
work.  In most European countries viewing is rather lower but it is above 2 hours a 
                                                 
23 Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997). 
24 Smith (1995). 
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day in most countries.  So it is not fanciful to suppose that TV has had a profound 
influence on our lives and on our well-being. 
 
Most of the public discussion about television has focussed on the issues of 
violence and sex.  This research generally supports the commonsense view that 
repeated violence on TV tends to legitimise violent behaviour, just as repeated scenes 
of adultery tend to legitimise adultery.  For example in the 1950s television was 
introduced in US different states in different years and the research has estimated that 
in the year that it arrived it increased larceny by 5% and we can only guess its 
subsequent cumulative effect.25  Moreover this research says little about the direct 
effect of TV upon happiness, so that here we are forced to rely on conjecture and 
indirect inference. 
 
The following research must be relevant.  In a series of psychological 
experiments with women, Kenrick showed them pictures of female models.26  He 
evaluated their mood before and after doing this.  After seeing the pictures of the 
models, the women’s mood fell.  So how must television affect the mood of the 
women who watch it?  In 3 hours of viewing TV each day a woman cannot fail to see 
a parade of beautiful women.  This is unlikely to enhance their mood.  And what 
about the effect on men?  Kenrick also showed the pictures of models to a sample of 
men.  Before and after this, he evaluated their feelings about their own wives.  After 
seeing the models, most men felt less good about their wives.27 
 
This research provides clues to a more general hypothesis.  Television creates 
discontent by bombarding us with images of body shapes, riches and goods we do not 
have.  It does this both in TV drama and in advertisements.  Among the most 
impressionable viewers of advertisements are young people – and it is them the 
advertisers target most assiduously.  Because all children see the same 
advertisements, they must all have the same thing in order to keep up with the Jones’.  
That pressure, which is deep in human nature anyway, is inevitably increased through 
television.  In Norway and Sweden advertising directed at children under 12 is 
                                                 
25 Hennigan et al (1982). In the year when transmission began, it reached 50% of households. 
26 Kenrick et al (1993). 
27 Kenrick et al (1989). See also James (1998). 
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banned.  Why not elsewhere?  And why should advertising not be limited to the 
provision of information? 
 
 
EQUALITY 
 
Finally let me revert to the theory of public economics.  The proponents of 
that theory from James Meade onwards insisted bravely that utility was measurable, 
for without such a notion it is impossible to consider the question of the optimal 
distribution of income.  They assumed that extra income was more valuable to the 
poor than to the rich.  But they were unable to produce empirical evidence in support 
of this.  We can now do so.  For example using Eurobarometer, to compare 
individuals, one can show that the marginal utility of relative income diminishes 
sharply as income rises.28  Equally, using the World Values Survey to compare 
countries, John Helliwell has estimated that increases in average income only raise 
average happiness in countries below around $15,000 per head.29  So here we have 
strong arguments for reducing the inequality of incomes both within and across 
countries.  And these arguments are reinforced by the low excess burden of taxation, 
which I discussed earlier. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
So what have I been saying? 
1. If my income rises I am happier, especially in the short term. 
2. But this makes others less happy and the effect on me fades in ways I did 
not foresee. 
3. So corrective taxation is needed if my work-life balance is to be 
efficient.  This should be a key doctrine in the Third Way. 
4. We ought not to encourage income comparisons and the zero-sum 
struggle for rank. 
                                                 
28 Di Tella, MacCulloch and Layard (2002). Happiness here is the latent variable in an ordered logit 
where 4 states of happiness are identified verbally. 
29 Helliwell (2001). Happiness here is self-reported happiness, using a scale from 1 to 10. 
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5. External incentives can undermine our internal motivation to do good 
work.  So PRP should be used only with care. 
6. Advertising should be controlled, especially towards children. 
7. We should redistribute income towards the poor. 
 
 
LOOKING FORWARD 
 
Finally let me set the scene for tomorrow, when I shall look at all the other 
factors which affect happiness, and their policy implications.  In designing policy our 
aim is to choose policies which maximise the sum of happiness, subject to our causal 
model and the limitations of our initial resources. 
 
Causal model 
Happiness depends on Genes, Experience, and Situation 
Experience depends on Genes, Background, National resources, and Policies 
Situation depends on Ditto 
 
(Policies include economic system; education system; health system; moral 
system; laws about family, work, advertising etc.) 
 
As you can see, I’ve included the genes at every stage in this approach, because I 
don’t want you to think I believe it’s easy to make people happier.  So let me end this 
lecture with a word about the role of the genes. 
 
GENES 
 
We all know from comparing siblings that people are born different, and these 
differences are then amplified by subsequent experience.  So our happiness depends 
on our genes and our experience (past and present).  Any social reformer has to be 
mainly interested in the role of experience since that is all that we can change.  But we 
will never understand that bit unless we understand the complete reality, and the 
complete reality includes a strong role for the genes. 
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Table 2 
Correlation of well-being 
across pairs of twins 
 
 Identical Non-identical 
Raised together  .44  .08 
Raised apart  .52  -.02 
 
So here is a typical finding, drawn from the Minnesota study of middle-aged twins.  
For each pair of twins the researchers knew whether they were identical or non-
identical, and whether they were brought up together or separated soon after birth.  
There were thus four groups (see Table 2).  Each person was tested for their level of 
well-being using the Multi-dimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ).30  Within 
each group the researchers then correlated the well-being of one twin with that of the 
other.  The correlations were above .4 for identical twins and roughly zero for non-
identical twins – and whether the twins were separated at birth or not made little 
difference to the correlation. 
 
I think it is important for parents to recognise that a part of our nature arises in 
this way, and it is even more important in the case of mental illness where we know 
that heredity plays a major role in schizophrenia and in depression, especially in 
manic-depression.  Those like Ronnie Laing who have blamed the behaviour of 
parents for everything that goes wrong have greatly added to the unhappiness of the 
world. 
 
Having said that, I want to make an extremely basic point.  If happiness 
depends on genes and environment and the average environment improves, average 
happiness increases but the standard measure of heritability may be unaffected.  For 
heritability looks at the variation of individual happiness around the average, and then 
measures the extent to which this variation can be explained by the genes.  If a better 
environment made everybody happier, heritability might remain just as high as 
before.  But everybody’s life would have improved.  This is exactly what has 
happened with height.  In the last century average height has increased by many 
inches.  But as far as we know the heritability of height has changed little.  Even if the 
                                                 
30 Lykken and Tellegen (1996), Table 1. 
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heritability of happiness continues to be quite high, it says nothing about what we 
might be able to do to the average level of happiness, provided we focus on what we 
can change, rather than on what we cannot. 
 
That’s what I shall talk about next time.  I believe there’s a great deal we can 
do and I shall end with a rousing defence of the view that the good of our society 
should indeed be the happiness of all. 
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